China’s relations with Angola have traditionally been friendly due to the fact that both countries were and still are ruled by Marxist Leninist regimes, but until recently the PRC’s presence in the country was rather insignificant. However, in the last five years or so China’s influence in the country has grown rapidly. From a marginal position in Beijing’s foreign policy priorities, Angola has move to the very forefront of China’s foreign relations. Today without question Angola is China’s most important partner on the African continent. Its importance lies in the fact that it is the second largest oil producer in Africa and is home to one of the world’s largest diamond fields and other precious stones such as rubies and emeralds.
In 2004 Angola became the PRC’s largest supplier of crude oil in the African continent, exporting 11.3 million tones. At the global level Angola is China’s third largest source of oil imports just behind Saudi Arabia and Iran. Taking into account that there are many unexplored oil fields in the country, Angola’s importance in meeting China’s insatiable demand for raw materials is likely to increase. For instance, between January and March 2006, Angola became temporarily China’s number one oil supplier, exporting an astronomical 456 000 barrels a day accounting for 15 per cent of China’s total oil exports and surpassing Saudi Arabia. On May 10, 2006 Angola’s state own oil company Sonangol and China’s Sinopec launched a $2.2 billion joint bid for block 17 and block 18, these new blocks have an estimated reserve of $1 billion barrels and $3 billion barrels respectively. These blocks are likely to move Angola from the position of being the third largest oil supplier to the PRC to number two on a long term basis..
Because energy security has become a pressing concern for the Chinese leadership, Beijing has embarked on a strategy to enhance its influence and presence in Angola and position itself as its number one partner. In 2005 Chinese Vice Premier Zeng Peiyan, and Chairman of the State Planning Commission, visited Angola with a bagful of incentives. These included a $6.3 million interest free loan and a pledge to invest $400 million in Angola’s telecommunications sector, and $100 million to upgrade the Angolan military’s communication network. PRC companies have also been active in infrastructure projects such as building roads, bridges, schools, shopping centers, office buildings and low cost housing projects. Early this year Chinese companies were awarded a major contract to rehabilitate the Bengela railroad, which is the country’s major railroad at a cost of $300-500 million. China has also been involved in the rehabilitation of Zambia’s rail network and is already participating in the construction of the stretch that will connect Zambia’s main railroad to the Bengela railroad, allowing landlocked Zambia to move its products via Angolan ports.
Chinese companies will also begin work on a major oil refinery soon. In 2006, trade between the two nations reached the $5 billion mark, making Angola the second largest Chinese trading partner in Africa and China the third largest Angolan trading partner. As of 2006 China has overtaken Portugal, Russia and Brazil as Angola’s number one aid donor. Many Chinese companies using convict labour from China are increasingly putting Portuguese companies who have traditionally dominated the country’s market out of business. While there are no reliable sources as to the number of Chinese nationals in Angola, they are believed to number in several thousands. China’s ever growing entrenchment in Angola’s economy means that its ability to influence the MPLA’S government policies has increased accordingly.
While Angola is only the sixth largest exporter to the US, supplying 510 million barrels a day as of March 2005, its importance for American energy security should not be underestimated. Particularly in a period when many of the regions that have traditionally supplied the US with its oil are witnessing significant political instability, such as Saudi Arabia, Venezuela and Nigeria. The volatile situation in Iraq and Iran’s continuous hostility towards the US further increases Angola’s importance for both China and the US.
China is also becoming a major source of loans to African states, challenging the once dominant position of former colonial powers such as France, Britain and Portugal but also greatly undermining the influence of major international organizations like the IMF. For instance, in March 2004 the Chinese government granted Angola $2 billion in soft loans in exchange for a commitment from the MPLA government to ensure continuous supply of crude oil to the PRC. China’s state own China Import Export Bank has also given the former Portuguese colony of Mozambique a $2 billion loan for the construction of a major dam on the Zambezi river. China’s relaxed loan policies are further increasing its grip over Angola, while at same time reducing the influence of Western nations such as Portugal to determine local developments.
With China’s influence growing over Angola and other former Portuguese African colonies such as Mozambique, the once influential colonial power that once upon a time proudly pioneered the expansion of European empires on the continent seems to have realized the futility of resisting the dragon. In 2005, Lisbon signed a Strategic Partnership for Cooperation and friendship with China. On the occasion, the Portuguese Prime Minister Joze Socrates told his Chinese counter part that “Portugal can affirm itself as China’s partner in Africa - China has huge quantities of capital but we have the knowledge of the territory, of the language, of the cultures and the traditions”.
After five centuries in the African continent, Portugal seems to have realized that it can no longer be an effective political and economic actor without close cooperation with China. Faced with a lack of enthusiasm from its Western friends to balance China’s growing power on the continent, Bandwagoning seems to be the only alternative left to Europe’s oldest empire building nation. As noted by a melancholic and rather poetic Portuguese diplomat: “Across the vast African savannas where once our ancestors build their first churches and forts, the wind from the East is blowing stronger than the wind from the West”.
Loro Horta is concluding his master’s degree in strategic studies at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies (IDSS) Nan yang Technology University, Singapore and specializes on China’s relations with the Portuguese-speaking countries and East Timor’s relations with Indonesia and Australia. Previously he was an advisor to East Timor’s defense department.
Somalia has entered into a new period of crises with the rise of Islamic forces in the country. After months of fierce fighting, on June 4 this year the militias under the Islamic Court Union (ICU) wrested control of Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu, from the secular warlords, who were reported to have had the backing of the United States. The warlords and businessmen, united under the Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism (ARPCT), have been routed out of the capital, which they had dominated since the collapse of the state in 1991. The Islamic militias have not only asserted their authority but have extended their control to most of the country’s southern region. It appears as if the country is heading towards rule by an extremist Muslim leadership.
Somalia as a Terror Threat
Since the September 11, 2001 events, Somalia has been under the US radar for being an ungoverned country with the potential of becoming a breeding ground for the Al Qaida terrorists. US officials have long feared that it would become an ideal base for Al Qaida to hide and plan attacks, given the anarchic state and the patchwork of competing warlords, and the absence of an effective central authority, police forces and visa system. Even prior to 9/11, terrorist attacks have emanated from the Somali soil. Al Qaida operatives used Somalia as a rear base to blow up the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam in 1998, to attempt to shoot down a British Airways jet at Nairobi’s international airport, and to carry out the October 2002 suicide attack on an Israeli-owned hotel in Mombassa.
Washington’s involvement in Somalia is predicated on a desire to undermine the terrorist threat. A task force of the US–led coalition has been active in the Horn of Africa, and has set up a military base at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti for counter-terrorism operations. In pursuance of its counter-terrorism strategy, the US has reportedly funded the warlords to monitor and “snatch” suspected terrorists in Somalia. According to John Prendergast, a senior adviser with the non-governmental International Crisis Group, “the US relies on buying intelligence from warlords and other participants in the Somali conflict, and hoping that the strongest of the warlords can snatch a live suspect or two if the intelligence identifies their whereabouts.”
In the new context, the US fears that the increased Islamic hold over the country will allow it to become a safe haven for Al Qaida militants and other religious fighters who ascribe to the Al Qaida ideology aimed at the US and its allies. In fact, there is a growing fear that the country will begin to resemble the former terrorist haven of Afghanistan.
Talibanisation or Stabilisation
The Islamist leader Sharif Sheikh Ahmed has said that they have no intention to impose a Taliban-style Islamic state; although they have not hidden their preferred style of governance. The country will be governed by Sharia law should they triumph. He has also denied harbouring any foreign terrorists, which the US is most concerned about and which the warlords have been accusing him of doing. But at the same time, he has vehemently opposed any US intervention in Mogadishu and has threatened that there would be serious repercussions if it does so, perhaps a repeat of the attacks that routed the US forces in 1993. He has justified the violent clashes against the warlords as the way of the insurgents to defend the people from the destructive actions of the warlords.
As far as the Somali people are concerned, they have shown characteristic restraint so far. The people are ideologically moderate and patient, and are unlikely to give any licence to Islamic extremism. But after suffering for a decade and half under the warlords perhaps they may prefer an Islamic state, in the hope that it would bring some order in the chaos.
Unlike the transitional Federal government, the Islamic courts have already garnered popular support for taking up the responsibility of providing social amenities such as hospitals and schools. In the absence of a state, they appear to be the only authority wielding power, and willing to alleviate the problems of the people and are the only ones seen to be making a difference. The Islamic Courts Union (ICU) thus could gain power because it offers a more attractive alternative to the warlords. Through its approach it has also been able to propagate its beliefs.
On its part, the ICU is not a compact centralised organisation but an umbrella group of local bodies divided between moderate Islamists who control eleven groups and the radicals with two. Also, their dominant theme has been nationalism and not Islamism, which is manifested in their demonstrations against deployment of foreign peacekeepers in Somalia and for which they have the people’s support. By projecting a nationalist stand, the ICU has the potential of becoming a force that transcends clan loyalties, provided it continues to moderate its Islamic agenda. However, there are divisions, which have surfaced recently, over whether it should form a Transitional Federal Government (TFG), a national unity government or a separate government based on Islamic law. The ICU has gained a decisive advantage but it is as yet not clear whether it will be able to secure lasting order. It certainly has the upper hand in the domestic power configuration, but not much support in the regional and international context. It also mistrusts Somalia’s neighbours. It is, however, already a formidable force that has the potential for ushering in both Talibanisation and stabilisation.
Regional and International Response
As far as regional and international responses are concerned, efforts are geared towards restoring peace and stability in Somalia. How far these will be successful remains to be seen. The Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) has underlined the urgent need for deployment of a regional peacekeeping force in Somalia and has also stressed the need for supporting the transitional federal institutions in the country to fully assume their responsibilities. The UN for its part also supports and endorses the decision taken by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)1 on June 13 to send peacekeeping troops to Somalia. The African states, especially the neighbouring states, are in favour of peacekeepers in Somalia, for the obvious reason that any kind of Islamic dictatorship in the neighbourhood will be detrimental to their interest. IGAD, in fact, has approved a peacekeeping mission on the condition that the UN partially relaxes the arms embargo. It is urging a dialogue between the ICU and the TFG. The TFG supports a peacekeeping mission for restoring order and stability.
But the ICU has fervently opposed any kind of foreign troop deployment. It mistrusts its neighbours. It does not believe that a Sudanese or Ugandan peacekeeping force will check Ethiopian influence, which is a principal concern, given Ethiopia’s past military record of destroying al- Ittihad bases in Somalia in the 1990s and its current deployment of troops along the border with Somalia. Even the Somali people, who repose so much of faith in the ICU, hardly have any faith in foreign troops. This mistrust stems from their bitter experiences. They appear to favour the kind of stability the radical Islamist forces are attempting to bring to Somalia. That, however, is unacceptable to the regional and international bodies. Also, it is too premature to conceive the ICU as a force wielding enough power to restore stability.
As part of its response to the evolving situation, Washington has formed a “contact group” consisting of its allies, Britain and Italy, and other mediators like Norway, Sweden, and the European Union along with Tanzania —the only East African State outside the IGAD. The group considers the TFG a “legitimate and viable framework” for stabilisation and has called for a dialogue between the ICU and TFG. However, they have not said anything regarding peacekeeping mission and exemptions to the UN arms embargo. For the meantime, though not very robust the contact group appears to be suitable as a stopgap measure. It is the best that Washington can offer at present; given the unpopularity it has earned among the wider Somali public.
US Role under Criticism
The US is mistrusted because of its 1993 debacle and its self-proclaimed war on terror. Many feel that if the US concerns about Al Qaida operatives or foreign fighters inside Somalia grow, then it may arm the warlords to fight a proxy war against Islamists. This will destabilise the whole region. They argue that if the long-term interest of the US is to assure itself of access to the strategic Horn of Africa, it should do well to avoid escalation of current tensions and conflicts in Mogadishu. However, if the US supports the warlords, it would betray the Somali people and undermine international efforts to give the transitional government the legitimacy to restore stability and peace.
Assessment: Plausible Scenarios
With the rise of Islamic forces to power, Somalia today is at the crossroads— either the prospects for stability will brighten or the country and the region may move towards more conflicts and destabilisation. In the light of these situations, three plausible scenarios may unfold:
- An Islamic dictatorship may emerge in Somalia and the US will continue to support the warlords despite the fact that their worldview is far bleaker than that of the Islamist militants. The US may also support Ethiopian infiltration into Somalia, enraging both the Islamic fundamentalists and drawing resistance from the Somalian people.
- Islamic forces may forge an alliance with the Transitional Federal Government and form a national unity government, backed by multilateral efforts of the “contact group” initiated by the US. The government may then secure popular support and wield requisite muscle power to maintain order. Reconstruction of Somalia would then take place under the aegis of the US and other European countries. A certain kind of stability would come in after 15 years of chaos and anarchy. High-level policy engagement would follow to revive a functioning administration and polity in Somalia.
- An alliance of the ICU and TFG does not materialise due to internal divisions between the moderates and radicals within the Islamic forces. ICU loses its balance in terms of gaining popular support and fulfilling its Islamic programme. Fragmented configuration of clan-based politics continues, with the likely re-emergence of warlords. Radical Islamic threat increases. To counter the threat, the US covertly backs the warlords and a peacekeeping mission is deployed by IGAD and AU, with the support of the UN. Somali mistrust for foreign intervention remains and the decade-old misery prolongs or exacerbates, contributing to tension and insecurity in the region, and leads to further destabilisation.
Given these plausible scenarios, the best strategy would be to attempt at reconciliation between the ICU and the TFG. The Islamic forces that have the popular support and the muscle power will then gain legitimacy and form a national unity government and become engaged in restoring order and normalcy, rather than heading towards Islamic extremism. It will even be easier for the TFG to pursue the reconciliation process, as it will be dealing with one powerful force rather than fractions of clan-based groups. The reconciliation can be augmented at the multilateral level by the US through the contact group. In the process, rather than only serving its interests through its counter-terrorism policy, the US will be serving the interest of Somalia and also contribute to the restoration of peace, security and reconciliation.
References/End Notes
- 1. The seven member-states of IGAD - Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda - cover an area of 5.2 million sq. km and have a population of more than 160 Million. The IGAD region is witnessing both internal and external conflicts; therefore the joint peace and conflict prevention efforts of IGAD member-states are crucial for peace and sustainable development of all countries.
When noted journalist Bertil Lintner first broke the story in April 2002 about the growth radicalism in Bangladesh, it was ridiculed and dismissed as a malicious story. There was complete outrage in Dhaka about the story; its lack of credibility and various motives were ascribed to it, even to the extent that its publisher, the Far Eastern Economic Review, was banned by the government. Unfortunately for Bangladesh, the matter did not end there but was soon followed by many such similar stories in the international press, including in Jane’s Intelligence Review, Time, New York Times as well as by the Indian media. On its part, the Bangladesh media has only in the last few years begun highlighting the problem of the growth of Islamic fervour and militancy. But it was the country’s political class that first raised the issue; as early as in 1998 Awami League leader and then Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina warned the country of possible dangers of Bangladesh transforming into a situation not different from that in Afghanistan when the Taliban took over the reins. Indeed, it was her fears over Taliban’s presence and activities that led to the cancellation of US President Bill Clinton’s Bangladesh visit in March 2000 outside Dhaka.
The issue was subsequently raked up during the campaign for the 8th Jatiya Sangsad elections in 2001. There were fears that some Taliban activists, who fled Afghanistan following the US offensive, had taken refuge in Bangladesh. During the campaign, ‘aamra hobo Taliban, Bangla hobe Afghan’ (we will be the Taliban, Bangladesh will become Afghanistan) was a popular slogan among a particular group of religious voters. Indeed, it was not uncommon to find rickshaws plying with bin-Laden’s poster stuck on them. Post her electoral defeat in 2001, Sheikh Hasina has been periodically using the prospect of Bangladesh transforming into another Afghanistan as a means of delegitimising and unseating the Khaleda government. BNP and its allies have consistently denied any such linkages calling the Awami League the real Taliban.
The October 2001 Jatiya Sangsad elections ushered in the BNP-led government that included two religious political parties (Jama’at- i- Islami and Islami Oikya Jote IOJ). Since then, there has been a definite spurt in violence and acts of terror that had begun in 1998.
The issue has today become a part of the discourse in Bangladesh given the sudden rise of violence in forms of bomb blasts, terror attacks and other forms of intimidation. Journalist and author Hiranmay Karlekar in his Bangladesh the Next Afghanistan actually delves into the trajectory of this phenomena in great detail. He traces events which gave rise to the militant Wahabi creed in Bengal as early as in the 18th century. The detailed footnoting of the trail of events that followed lend it great academic credence. This work of topical importance, indeed the first by any Indian author, has quite obviously been written by someone who has been closely watching Bangladesh.
While, the author says Mujibur Rahman’s role in giving amnesty to collaborators is rather valid, he does not explain why Mujib did what he did. This would have gone a long way to explain why Bangladesh society has unfolded the way it has. To squarely put the blame on a particular political power or government undermines some of the core problems that lie within the state itself. If it’s simply the doing of a political party then the problem of Bangladesh becoming the next Afghanistan can be eliminated by the removal of some parties. But this phenomena is far deeply entrenched in society itself, as is evident from the secular socialist Awami League constantly having to drape itself in religious garbs.
There can be no quarrel about how Bangladesh has played into the hands of religious extremism. The book focuses on how Bangladesh has now become the Al Qaida’s launching pad for operations against the US. Given the linkages that the Inter Services Intelligence of Pakistan has maintained with the Director General of Field Operations of Bangladesh, it was but an obvious recourse for the Al Qaida operatives to take. The author also equates the role of Jama’at- i- Islami to that of the Al Qaida, which imposed similar conservative rules in Afghanistan.
However, the book tends to ignore the growth and sustenance of other religious political parties like the IOJ, which has been far more conservative and vocal about its Islamic norms and code of conduct, especially for women. This is in contrast to the Jama’at that has women cadres at district and national levels, and has been the ‘queen maker’ in Bangladesh since the 1991 ushering in of electoral democracy. The IOJ, it is as rightly pointed out, supports 15,000 madrassas in Bangladesh and its leader Amini openly supports an Islamist revolution in Bangladesh. But today IOJ factions are not only breaking away from the BNP coalition but also joining hands with the Awami League as well as Bikalpa Dhara Bangladesh (BDB) party, both supposedly secular, middle of the path parties.
The author has squarely blamed the coalition for the present state Bangladesh finds itself in. It would be useful to ponder how in less than five years, the militancy (which is said to be home grown by a large section of Bangladeshis) has been able to muster such strength? It would be naïve to think this development took place virtually overnight. In fact, as the book says, militancy in Bangladesh began long before the BNP came to power in 2001. While the Awami League can be said to be the only mass base secular party in Bangladesh today, to absolve it of any role or rather lack of role in controlling the ascendance of militant elements when it was in power is too simplistic. The Awami League is now highlighting militancy at both national and international forums purely for temporary political gains.
If Bangladesh is a moderate Islamic country where the bulk of the population is tolerant and disinclined towards fundamental bigotry, how come Taslima Nasreen still needs to live outside her homeland? How did a riot-like situation prevail when the country’s high court gave a ruling against a fatwa? How come the Ahmadiyas were nearly declared non- Muslims were it not for serious US pressure? How is it that sports events with women participants have had to be cancelled? Is all this just a reflection of Jama’at- i- Islami influence over Bangladesh state and society or is there much deeper malaise that no one seem to be addressing? Why is that those advocating education for women are ostracised from the society?
That the Jama’at- i- Islami has been harsh on women is well known. But, as the author mentions time and again, their mass base is rather small. Then what is it that makes them so relevant to all political parties that want to form a government? It may be easy to demonise the Jama’at, but it is still difficult to explain the party’s or the scramble amongst the mainstream political parties to include them as part of any government formation move.
Karlekar does not adequately address the questions that if Jama’at- i- Islami is able to play such an influential role in society, why will it upset the apple cart just before the elections and draw unwanted attention to itself? What has made it run out of patience given the dividends that its ‘deep well, tubecentric’ politics had given it? The answer obviously lies in the deep schism that has developed not only within the BNP over the issue but also in the Jama’at- i- Islami as well as other religious political parties that have grown impatient over the slow pace of Islamisation of Bangladesh society
While the author has a rather bleak prognosis for Bangladesh, he has been rather one-sided about the critical estimation of the irresponsible role of the country’s leadership. The book does not really address the issue of how leaders like Sheikh Hasina and Mohammed Ershad had failed to rise to the occasion in addressing this problem. It is a fact that the growth of militancy was largely overlooked and ignored, and often passed off as a law and order situation because of BNP’s coalition with religious political parties.
While the BNP, even without its coalition partners, enjoys a substantial majority in the Jatiya Sangsad, it is said that the party with greater mass appeal is the Awami League. This makes the picture more interesting in Bangladesh. And this is probably why the BNP has been reluctant to break free of its religious partners despite all evidence of militancy leading towards these religious groups. Coalition politics in Bangladesh is an obvious choice: one, because the Awami League managed to regroup itself with a 14-party coalition which in November 2005 held a very successful rally; and two, given the ability of the Jama’at- i- Islami to rally around other political parties. In fact, it is because of this fear that the BNP continues to hold on to the Jama’at.
In fact, it would have been easy to predict the electoral mood in aftermath of the recent violence as witnessed in Bangladesh, most of which, as has been pointed out, is said to be related to religious political parties. Logically then, the BNP also should break free of such a coalition partner for the elections, which are due in the next six months. But the advantage that accrues to those in power is so strong that none of the political parties in Bangladesh are willing to look at the larger problem that is staring them in the face. And this is the real crisis facing Bangladesh and not Talibanisation. The latter is only a symptom of the disease that afflicts Bangladesh
The Guerrila Dynasty – Politics and Leadership in North Korea
by Adrian Buzo, I.B. Tauris & Co., London, 1999
Price: GBP: 12.95 pp. 323
North Korea in the World Economy
by E. Kwan Choi, E. Han Kim and Yeesook Merrill (Eds)
Routledge Curzon New York, 2003, Price: GBP 75pp. 246
North Korea : The Politics of Regime Survival
by Young Whan Kihl and Hong Nack Kim (Eds),
M.E. Sharpe, New York, 2006 ,Price: USD 78.95 pp. 322
The paradox that is North Korea primarily stems from its being the final outpost of Cold War theatrics. As an anachronism in the post-Cold War world, with a political system that exemplifies the first instance of dynastic succession in the ‘socialist’ world; an economy that has witnessed the degeneration of the ‘socialist industry’; a society that for all practical purposes is sustained by massive amounts of food aid following years of drought, floods and chronic mismanagement of resources, North Korea in most contemporary discourses is portrayed as an ‘embarrassment’ or ‘strategic nightmare’, given its proven capabilities of launching long-range missiles coupled with an ongoing nuclear weapons programme.
The books reviewed here are a sampling of the literature increasingly available on North Korea–a country that until very recently was ‘beyond the pale’ of academic inquiry. Adrian Buzo in his book The Guerrilla Dynasty, locates the very political temperament of the North Korean regime as the rerum concordia discors (the concord of things through discord). In a fascinating and thought-provoking narrative, Buzo isolates as ‘generic characteristics’ the lessons Kim Il Sung and his colleagues drew from the universal laws of Marxism, the revolutionary organisational and tactical framework developed chiefly by Lenin and the practical experience of Communist parties in power. Flowing from these have been the two revolutionary political institutions–the ruling monolith Korean Worker’s Party (KWP–Choson Nodong-dang) and the Korean People’s Army (KPA– Choson Inmingun). ‘Specific characteristics’ that have been applied by the North Korean leadership, according to Buzo were the peculiar traits of militarism, isolation, extreme centralisation (even by socialist standards!), and the cult of personality leadership that has evolved into hereditary succession.
Juche Politics
Located in a unique geopolitical setting, North Korea, despite its limited geographical size, population and resources, has been the ‘irrational’ actor exercising a disparate tenor to the rather ‘rational’ actors surrounding it. These include the continental powers, Russia and China, on its northeast and northwest, the highly industrialised economic superpower, South Korea, on its south, and of course, Japan, across the seas, one would not be entirely off the mark to characterise North Korea as being situated at the crossroads of Northeast Asia. Disregarding the perils of being located in a setting dominated by big powers, the history of North Korean attempts at being recognised as a legitimate entity have always been directed towards the only external powerful actor in the region–the United States. Since the Korean War (1950-53), the poignancy of a divided peninsula and the radical interpretation of ideology as also superpower rivalry divided the Korean people–a fait accompli that followed the Armistice of 1953. With the demise of the socialist ideology following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a ‘globalised order’, North Korea has, to the amazement and annoyance of observers, turned its back to the world and continued to chart out a course of action fundamentally guided by its central ideology of Juche.
The word juche was used for the first time on December 28, 1955, by Kim Il Sung in a speech entitled “On the Need to Repel Dogmatism and Formalism and to Establish Juche in Carrying Out Ideological Programs.” Juche refers to the most correct Marxism-Leninism-oriented guiding philosophy, designed to carry out revolution and construction. The semantic interpretation of juche is “self-identity,” but the idea of “self-reliance” is more appropriate if one were to comprehend the North Korean milieu. Juche ideology consists of two parts – the philosophical theory, which maintains that the masses are the masters of history and revolution, and the guiding principles, which justify a personality cult by saying that ‘the masses are not able to take up spontaneously any revolutionary course unless they are organised into revolutionary forces and are led by the suryong (the Leader). An integrated trinity thus emerges, with the suryong, the party, and the masses.
Ironically, North Korea is still ruled by its deceased founding leader, Kim Il Sung, yet another dubious distinction for a much-reviled country. Legitimising this is the Preamble of the 1998 Constitution, which states, “the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the entire Korean people will uphold the great leader comrade Kim Il Sung as the Eternal President of the Republic, defend and carry forward his ideas…[on] the juche revolution under the leadership of the Workers Party of Korea.”
In the Kim Jong Il (Dear Leader) era and following the 1998 constitutional revision, although the KWP is still a force, it is the National Defence Commission (NDC) that has emerged as the most powerful political organisation. Without doubt, the NDC is the command post of the ruling elite and despite the setbacks of the past, it is the military-first (songun- chong chi) politics that prevails in the country. The logic behind Kim Jong Il’s promotion of a ‘military-first’ policy is two-fold: to be the veneer for the Kim regime’s shortcomings in the face of dismal economic failure and food shortages; and to use the military to strengthen his authority to not only defend North Korea from external threats, but also to build a so-called kangsong taeguk (Strong and Prosperous Great Power).
Juche Diplomacy
The aspect of “self-reliance” inspires North Korea’s bargaining in its strategic diplomacy. Largely termed as ‘brinkmanship,’ North Korea conducts its diplomatic negotiations with adversaries and allies with tact and determination. It has proved repeatedly that its style of bargaining is not only robust but also governed by the rules of negotiating on the edge. The diplomatic orientation of juche is to be witnessed in North Korea’s striking and rather strident adoption of the personality cult as a reaction to the Sino-Soviet ideological diffusion of the late 1950s and early 1960s. By not siding with its allies and maintaining independence in the exercise of its foreign policy during the Cold War years, North Korea exhibited the vices of seclusion and self-righteousness rather than the virtues of flexibility and pragmatism that were needed and are the lietmotif of modern diplomacy and statecraft. This peculiar behaviour may also be called the ‘Trojan Horse’ paranoia that keeps North Korea from joining the world, as it distrusts foreigners, lest they take advantage of its weakness and vulnerability. A historical precedent of this behaviour was displayed by the Choson Dynasty, which secluded itself from the outside world for much of the 18th and 19th centuries.
North Korea’s strategic objectives rarely deviate from a set of preestablished strategic goals and plans. Its long-lasting policy goal of forcing US troop withdrawal from the southern half of the Korean peninsula is based on its strategic objective of realising Korean unification on its own and without interference from foreign powers. Further, as several rounds of six-party talks have revealed, North Korea’s demand for direct negotiation with the US is to replace the Korean Armistice agreement with a permanent peace treaty that very clearly is predicated upon the strategic calculus of undermining the rationale for US troop presence in South Korea. While the Clinton Administration was not averse at initiating a dialogue with the North Korean leadership and even endorsed a visit to Pyongyang in October 2000 by Madeleine Albright, the current Bush Administration has derailed the relative gains of the October 2000 visit by labelling North Korea as part of an ‘axis of evil’, being complicit therefore in entertaining North Korea’s ‘brinkmanship.
From the North Korean perspective, US conventional air, naval and ground plus nuclear forces in South Korea, Japan and the Western Pacific (Guam in particular) pose an imminent threat to its survival. Further buttressing this threat is Washington’s refusal to normalise diplomatic relations and deny recognition and legitimacy to the Kim Jong Il regime as also the slapping of multiple layers of economic sanctions that impede North Korea’s efforts at economic revitalisation. Young Whan Kihl and Hong Nack Kim in their book, North Korea: The Politics of Regime Survival, correctly, categorise ‘regime survival’ as the prime motivation goading the North Korean leadership. As a corollary, it is also surmised that the North Korean adherence to juche is antithetical to the ancient Korean dynastic practice of sadaechui that transliterates into “Serving the Great and belittling the self.”
In the strategic diplomacy of bargaining and negotiating, a conspicuous aspect limiting North Korea’s options is that its friendships with significant allies remain tepid while its adversaries retain a high degree of cohesion in their containment of Pyongyang, throughout a period of exceptional change and flux in the region.
Juche Economics and the Role of China
Choi, Kim and Merrill’s North Korea in the World Economy (the academic outcome of an August 2001 conference on “North Korea in the World Economy” by the Korea-America Economic Association) fills the gap as regards an evaluation of the North Korean economy – a task hugely complicated by the relative secrecy and lack of verifiable data. One of the most striking aspects of North Korea’s evolution in the years following the 1953 Armistice was the adoption of a neo-spartan model of creating a socialist system. This model had militarism as its credo and it was applied as an organising principle of both society and economic activity, especially since early 1960s following the uncertainty that clouded the socialist world after the Sino-Soviet ideological rupture. The break propelled North Korea into an isolationist and reclusive mode of existence, even within the socialist bloc. Maintaining the neo-spartan model, it was the military that was responsible for half of all industrial production, enjoying priority access to raw materials, first call on the nation’s power grid and transport infrastructure, and not accountable to the State Planning Commission. This sustained militaristic purpose of economic activity is undoubtedly, responsible for North Korea’s destitution. Aptly, the militarism of North Korea supports Weber’s observation that, “the war economy, with its overwhelming sense of contingency and its rough, inefficient methods of resource allocation, inherently tends towards bankruptcy.”1
Immune to the practicalities of transforming the economic structure, Kim Jong Il, continues to lay emphasis on the primacy of the military. Perhaps, the only indication of any change came in July 2002 when North Korea introduced limited measures for economic reform. These have four major components – micro-economic policy changes to increase the importance of material incentives; macro-economic policy measures decentralising decision-making; the establishment of special economic zones, and an external aid seeking strategy. The adjustments led to an end to the rationing system for daily commodities (except food), a huge increase in prices of essentials and in wages, a major devaluation of the currency (official exchange rate), abolishing of the foreign exchange coupon system, increased autonomy of enterprises, authorisation of the establishment of markets and other trading centres, and a limited opening of the economy to foreign investment. Prices remain under centralised control but at levels closer to those existing in peasant (free) markets. North Korea has not abandoned the socialist planned economy, but it has been compelled to reform certain aspects.
The introduction of these limited economic reforms has the subtle, yet nuanced, influence of Beijing. In this light, Kim Jong Il’s recent visit to China offers some interesting clues. From January 10 to 18 this year, Kim Jong Il made a remarkably conspicuous “unofficial” visit to China. Kim’s itinerary (including Wuhan, Guangzhou, Zhuhai, and Shenzhen) was reminiscent of Deng Xiaoping’s famous Southern Tour of January-February 1992 (covering Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shanghai), which reaffirmed Beijing’s commitment to economic reform in the post- Tiananmen era. Kim made it clear that he was interested in seeing for himself the results of China’s reform. Clearly, his intellectual curiosity and openness to new ideas are positive attributes conducive to reform in North Korea.
Encouraged by this historical precedent, some North Korea watchers regard Kim’s “Southern Tour” as a prelude to extensive reform in the near future. To corroborate their case, they add that economic opening and reform measures followed Kim’s previous visits to China. In particular, they point to Kim’s trip to Shanghai in January 2001, when he exclaimed that Shanghai had undergone a cataclysmic transformation and “changed beyond recognition”,- a remark he repeated during his latest visit. Kim subsequently circulated an internal memo in October 2001, emphasising “New Thinking” and laying out the basic principles for the July 2002 reforms. For sceptics, Kim Jong Il’s Southern Tour is largely a feint for foreign consumption, designed to reinforce Chinese and South Korean perceptions that he is someone they can do business with. They also believe that Kim’s trip is not a prelude to fundamental reform, but rather an attempt to draw political support and economic assistance from China and South Korea in the form of continued food aid (as the World Food Programme is downsizing its presence in North Korea) and the supply of energy and credit lines.
Two broad inferences can be drawn from Kim Jong Il’s Southern Tour. First, the relationship between China and North Korea is far deeper and more extensive than before, and, second, while North Korea will pursue further economic reforms, its path is likely to be different from China’s, as indicated by Kim’s emphasis on developing a model suited to the ‘peculiar characteristics of the country.’ Juche thus remains the country’s ideological bulwark.
During his January visit, Kim met all nine members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo and held separate talks with Wu Bangguo and Wen Jiabao as well as with Hu Jintao. In addition to having an in-depth exchange of views on “important international and regional issues of mutual concern”, Kim Jong Il and Hu Jintao spent time discussing economic matters. Wen Jiabao and Kim Jong Il exchanged views on boosting economic cooperation between China and North Korea. The Chinese premier is learnt to have explained to the North Korean leader the current economic situation in China and the relevant content of the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-2010). This exchange may be of more than passing interest for the two leaders, given that North Korea is about to implement a multiyear economic plan (three-year basic industry and agriculture plan from 2006 to 2008) for the first time since 1996, when its economic difficulties made multi-year planning redundant. Not only does China provide North Korea with an example of an economy where “plan” and “market” coexist, but there also is ample room for coordination between the two sides, especially with regard to bilateral investment projects.
In fact, since Kim Jong Il visited Beijing just before the inter-Korean summit in 2000 to restore North Korea’s relations with China, their economies have become increasingly integrated. Their bilateral trade has increased from $0.49 billion in 2000 to $1.39 billion in 2004, raising China’s share in North Korea’s total trade from 20 per cent to 37 per cent. In comparison, South Korea’s share in North Korea’s trade has stayed around 18 per cent while Japan’s share has plummeted from 19 per cent to 7 per cent. Furthermore, prices in North Korea’s informal markets track those in China’s north-eastern provinces, as merchants and ordinary citizens are increasingly engaged in cross-border trade. Gone are the days when Chinese companies were reluctant to invest in North Korea.
It, therefore, appears that Kim Jong Il is in search of a model that will bring about economic development and political stability given North Korea’s conditions, which are different from China’s in terms of geography and geopolitics as well as economics. Also, unlike China, which embarked on extensive reform after normalising relations with the US, North Korea is yet to normalise relations with the US and Japan. In addition, while China was a predominantly agricultural country when it launched extensive reforms and enjoyed a large productivity increase after breaking up collective farms, North Korea has a relatively small agricultural sector and probably should rely more on improvement in labour-intensive manufacturing.
Of course, regional security issues continue to be of great concern for North Korea and China even as their bilateral relations deepen on all fronts. China is likely to do what it can to get North Korea back to the negotiating table and resume the six-party talks. During their summit meeting, Kim and Hu in effect agreed to work together to “overcome the difficulties” and get the process going again. However, Chinese pressure on North Korea with regard to the six-party talks should not be overstated. When the US and North Korea signed the Agreed Framework in 1994, China was quite concerned about the possibility of the US establishing a foothold in North Korea. After five years of weak US engagement in East Asia under the Bush Administration, however, China enjoys a much stronger position. Its influence in North Korea and the rest of East Asia is rising, and China is in no hurry to pressurise North Korea as long as the six-party talks process continues.
In conclusion, despite the multiple external shocks and internal woes, North Korea has managed to defy all collapsist scenarios and predictions, as well as the classical realist axiom that “the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.” This paradox is partly explained by geography – North Korea occupies China’s cordon sanitare and is well placed in prolonging its survival. The economic and political factors charting the course of China-North Korea relations have the potential to develop into a ‘strategic dilemma’ for the US and Japan. While the US adopts a policy of ‘tough negotiations’, hoping that the North Korean regime will eventually succumb to pressure, the reverse seems more plausible, as China, South Korea and to some extent Russia do not want the regime to collapse, preventing the resultant chaos. Accordingly, it is in Beijing’s interests to invest the minimum necessary political and economic capital to sustain North Korea in order to avert a regime collapse.
References/End Notes
- 1. Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation (translated from the German by A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (ed.) with an introduction by Talcott Parsons, New York, Free Press, 1964, pp. 76-77.
- 1. Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation (translated from the German by A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (ed.) with an introduction by Talcott Parsons, New York, Free Press, 1964, pp. 76-77.
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) of the United Kingdom has come out with a White Paper on British international strategic priorities for the next ten years. British Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, while launching the sixty-page vision statement titled "Active Diplomacy for a Changing World: The UK's International Priorities" also delivered a lecture on this occasion at a conference of senior British diplomats in London on March 28, 2006.
The strategy paper actually attempts to update and incorporate the changes and challenges faced by the UK in the last three years. The earlier White Paper of 2003 was the first of its kind and outlined Britain's international priorities. In the intervening period the UK experienced some major challenges, domestic as well as international, and held some very important assignments. To be precise, the year 2005 was quite eventful for the UK - it held the annual G8 presidency; national elections took place in May; the July 7 terrorist attacks in the London Metro claimed 52 lives and together with the foiled attacks on July 21 marked a watershed in contemporary British history; and Britain held the half-yearly European Union (EU) presidency in the second-half of 2005.
It is against this background that the latest vision statement of the UK should be seen. It sums up its recent experiences and underpins Britain's multidirectional, multi-pronged and multilateral approach to address current challenges. Most importantly the document acknowledges the 'unprecedented' economic growth of India and China. In stark contrast to the 2003 document, in which neither Asian nation was given importance, this document deals at length with future projections about their economies, GDP, demographic trends and energy requirements. While both India and China keep appearing in the document, India, being the 'largest democracy', gets the special emphasis of a strategic partner of the UK.
In its entirety the FCO document presents itself as a combination of national, European as well as transatlantic approaches. While bilateral relationships still remain vital for the UK, approaches at the level of EU are designated as the 'most important multilateral commitment'. The EU-3, i.e. Britain, France and Germany, is given due importance, indicating that in future they would undertake major assignments like the on-going dealings with Iran. The paper also recognises nine strategic priorities including, terrorism and proliferation of WMD, organised crime, conflict prevention, illegal immigration, sustainable development and environment protection, etc. As far as perceived major threats for the UK are concerned the British strategy follows the European Security Strategy adopted in December 2003.
The diplomatic focus of the vision statement seems to be echoing the trend established by the United States in recent months. It may be recalled that Condoleezza Rice, the US Secretary of State in her speech on "Transformational Diplomacy" delivered at Georgetown University on January 18, 2006, highlighted discrepancies in the posting of American diplomats in various parts of the world. Rice underscored the fact that both India and Germany host the same number of US diplomats though the former has a larger population. She added that the US would reallocate its diplomats from Europe to India and China. The British Strategy Paper also follows this American reasoning. At present 29 per cent of Britain's total diplomatic strength is in Europe, while 13 per cent of British diplomats are posted in South Asia and 15 per cent in the Asia-Pacific region. The Strategy Paper is unambiguous that in conformity with future trends, the UK would increase its diplomatic strength in India. In fact, Jack Straw, in his speech, actually stated that the British diplomatic strength in India has already been increased by 16 per cent in the last two years.
Current and future projections using certain key parameters for the growth of Indian and Chinese economies deserve to be noted here. While China and India remain the top two in the growing population chart for the next twenty years, Europe stands first in terms of its ageing population showing an increasingly old age dependency ratio of more than 30 per cent in 2025. In the area of energy consumption, the US and Canada would be the largest consumers in 2030, while India would come fifth after China and the EU. But in terms of per capita GDP, as the Vision Statement illustrates, India - though a major global economy - will come only after the US, EU, Canada, Japan, South Korea, Russia, Mexico, China and Brazil. Some salient trade figures may also be cited: after USA and China, the UK is India's third largest partner. Bilateral trade during January-September 2005 was around US$ 7.4 billion, but this is only one per cent of global annual British trade, and in comparison with UK-China trade it is only one-fifth. As both India and the UK are aware of the lack in optimal exploitation of the trade potential despite the continuous increase in trade volumes, bilateral trade is expected to increase in the coming years. The document also refers to, as challenges for both India and China, the perilous path of balancing reform measures and maintaining parity in development across their various regions. In comparison with China, India's democratic traditions and rule of law are upheld as positives and marking the fundamentals of vibrant Indo-UK relations.
Lastly, under the rubric of "Active Diplomacy", India gets special mention as the source country for the largest number of visas issued by the UK as well as in key areas of cooperation like defence, police and crime, reversion of illegal immigrants of Indian origin, etc. It is therefore more than likely that bilateral engagement between India and the UK - not only in trade relations but in other crucial areas as well - would be more intensified in the coming years. This must however be considered within the ambit of the EU-India strategic partnership as well as the Joint Action Plan adopted at the 7th EU-India Summit in 2005 under the British presidency. Apart from the EU-India strategic partnership, India has also been maintaining bilateral strategic partnerships with other major European nations. The continent has observed the recently concluded Indo-US strategic partnership with interest. The current European trend, be it at the governmental level or in think tanks, is that the EU should take its strategic partnership with India seriously. European analysts complain about the apathy shown by Indian experts towards the EU and the Union's perceived insignificance in the global scenario as a military bloc. In the coming years, it remains to be seen how the Indo-UK strategic partnership as well as Indo-EU would evolve in contrast to the newly concluded Indo-US Strategic partnership.
The actions of the Pakistani government in North Waziristan during the last one month are indicative of adhocism and adventurism. It was only on February 23 that the Governor of NWFP, Khalil-ur-Rehman, announced that the government had suspended operations in North Waziristan Agency because it believed that tribesmen were capable of restoring peace and normalcy through their own customs and traditions. However just six days later, 41 militants including their Chechen commander were reportedly killed in a raid carried out using helicopter gunships on their hideout in North Waziristan. This volte-face by the government just before the all-important visit of President Bush to Pakistan was apparently triggered by articles in the US media, which accused Pakistan of not doing enough in the 'war on terror'. It was also alleged that certain sections of the Pakistani establishment were still in league with the remnants of the Taliban. This media blitz had put enormous pressure on the Pakistani government to 'do something' and resulted in this operation by the Pakistan Army's Special Services Group in which they claimed to have killed 40 foreign (mainly Chechen) militants.
Local residents led by a radical cleric Maulana Abdul Khaliq, however, denied the presence of any foreigners and claimed that all those killed were local tribesmen, their women and children. They contended that innocent people were massacred by the Pakistani Army to please President Bush, especially as this operation came within a week of the government's widely publicised suspension of operations in North Waziristan Agency. The furious local militants retaliated by storming the bazaar of Miranshah, the headquarters of North Waziristan Agency and capturing the telephone exchange and other government offices. They also warned tribal elders and the Ulema not to attend Jirgas summoned by the political agent of North Waziristan. They then surrounded the fortified military posts and gave a deadline to the government to withdraw troops and helicopters from the town. The authorities in return warned the militants to leave the bazaar and give up their positions or be ready to face the consequences. Clashes erupted immediately after President Bush landed in Pakistan. Both sides wanted to signal their resolve to President Bush and in the fiercest fight in Waziristan over 100 people were killed in battles in which helicopter gunships and medium artillery were used liberally. The telephone exchange and most of the bazaar in Miranshah were razed to the ground. However, despite using inordinately heavy firepower, the Pakistani Army could not recapture the town till President Bush had departed Pakistan. To most Pakistanis this incident demonstrated another attempt by the government to win US accolade by sacrificing Pakistani blood.
Waziristan covers an area of 11,585 square kilometres (4,473 square miles) and is divided into North and South Waziristan agencies. The total population today is estimated to be less than a million. The region is one of the most inaccessible, has an extremely rugged terrain and has remained outside the direct control of the Pakistani government. Hitherto, it has only been controlled nominally by the central government of Pakistan. The Waziri tribes that inhabit the region are fiercely independent, but had not bothered the Pakistani government till the fall of the Taliban government in neighbouring Afghanistan, when the region turned out to be a good sanctuary for the fleeing Al Qaeda and Taliban elements. Pakistani troops entered the region for the first time in late 2002 after long negotiations with the tribes, which reluctantly agreed to allow the military's presence on the assurance that it would bring in funds and development work. However, once the military action started, a number of Waziri tribals took it as an attempt to subjugate them.
During the last three years in which Waziristan has been a hot-bed of terrorist activities, the government has applied various strategies to rein in the militants suspected to be hiding there but has consistently failed. Despite using disproportionately heavy force, the Army has not been able to establish the writ of the state. It has conducted military operations in which many lives have been lost. It offered amnesties to militants and then reneged on its promise and has seen the tribal leaders supporting the government being killed. There have been a number of co-ordinated operations by Pakistani and US troops in the region. Besides, the US has resorted to targeted killings of militants using UAVs, one of which led to the killing of the militant leader Nek Mohammad, who had reached an agreement with the government. The Army operations have resulted in a large number of civilian casualties, further increasing the alienation of the population. The Army also tried to buy off the loyalties of the militants by paying them huge sums of money, but it has failed to herald peace in the region. According to one estimate, in 2005 alone 300 civilians were killed and about 800 injured while 250 army personnel lost their lives and more than 600 were injured.
Today the Pakistani Armed Forces are overstretched and there is a limit to the number of fronts on which the Pakistani Army can fight - there are problems in Balochistan and Northern Areas besides Waziristan. The Army is still involved in rehabilitation work in the earthquake-affected zone and will continue to remain involved for quite some time to come. It has to guard the borders to the West and the East and be prepared for occasional sectarian strife and Al Qaeda strikes. On top of all this, the recent demonstrations against the Danish Cartoons have clearly indicated that the general public is fed up with the government and is looking for chances to give vent to its frustrations. Repeated US attacks on Pakistani soil have not only compromised Pakistani sovereignty but have also incensed the public. Under the circumstances it would probably be a wise move for the Pakistan military to extricate itself from the quagmire of Waziristan and bide its time.
Despite committing over 70,000 to 80,000 troops supported by helicopter gunships, artillery and air force, the writ of the state in the region has remained at best tenuous. The frequent incidents of violence make a mockery of the government statements that all is under control. The offer of ceasefire was meant to merely legitimise the de facto position. Top ranking Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders, in any case, have been moving in and out of the region with impunity. However, reports in the US media that a section of the Pakistani establishment is in league with Al Qaeda and Taliban, just prior to President Bush's visit, forced the Pakistani establishment to disturb the hornets' nest. However, having done that, it does not know how to restore order and is looking forward to a face saving formula to extricate itself from this quagmire. Recent attacks on Afghanistan and its leadership is an attempt by the Pakistani leadership to mask its failures in Waziristan from the international media and to divert domestic attention from the strong-arm tactics being used there.
The visit of US President George Bush to India in the first week of March and the signing of the Indo-US nuclear deal have evoked reactions in Western media as expected. Viewpoints expressed in the vast English media, professional websites as well as other discussion fora present a spectrum of analyses. However, it is pertinent to have a look at the vernacular German media which have been closely observing the Indo-US strategic partnership not episodically but with thorough interest. It is also interesting to note that the deal was given due importance at the highest level of the ruling Christian Democratic Union- Social Democratic Party (CDU-SPD) coalition.
At the outset it should be mentioned that German commentators have been following the dynamics of Indo-US strategic partnership since July last year when Manmohan Singh visited the United States. Matthias Rüb, the Washington correspondent of the German daily Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), has described the growing closeness of the US with India and China as the "Pacific Triangle". In his view, the most noteworthy outcome of Manmohan Singh's visit to Washington was the factual recognition of India as an official nuclear power. Similarly, Christian Wagner, the South Asia expert at the German think tank Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) in Berlin, depicted Indo-US security relations as the beginning of a new era. Both experts were unanimous in their assessment of the seriousness the US attached to its relations with India. While Wagner (in July 2005) opined that though Germany and France had no cause for worry about existing military cooperation with India since the latter has been following the policy of arms diversification, he did, however, express the apprehension that in the foreign and security policy spheres the EU would lose further ground in India as a potential partner. Rüb, for his part, contended that the rationale behind US interests in India and China was the American formulation of the EU of "medium powers" facing demographic, economic and structural challenges.
Given this backdrop, it was certain that the US President's visit to India would be minutely observed in Germany. Gero von Randow identifies India as a "special case" in Die Zeit, the prestigious German weekly with Social-Democratic leanings. The recent Indo-US agreement, in his view, has set that process into motion which American and Indian politicians had already decided upon in July last year. von Randow adds that nuclear cooperation between Washington and New Delhi would annoy Brazil, South Korea or Taiwan, and that other nations like South Africa, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia may well follow the Indian example. However, he concludes with utter scepticism with respect to other possible alternatives for dealing with India as well as the future of the NPT.
But the most important observation comes from an interview given by Karsten D. Voigt, Coordinator for US-German Relations at the German Foreign Office and a close associate of the former German Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder. When asked whether different yardsticks have been applied vis-à-vis Iran and India, Voigt categorically stated that while India does not deny the rights of existence of any of its neighbours, Iran does in the case of Israel. Nonetheless, if a common German viewpoint about the Indo-US strategic partnership can be discerned, it lies in the argument that sections within the US administration have a long-term strategy to use India as a counter-weight to China and the recent nuclear agreement is a step towards that direction.
Finally, it is interesting to note how the EU and especially its most important constituent, Germany, shape its future foreign policy initiatives towards India keeping in view the recent Indo-US partnership. As Karsten D. Voigt has pointed out, the designation of Bernd Mützelburg, the security policy advisor of former Chancellor Schröder and an experienced diplomat who led the recent G4 initiative in the UN, as the new ambassador to India shows Germany's earnestness in promoting good ties with India. At the level of bilateral trade and cultural exchange it is worth mentioning that two international fairs held in Germany in 2006 have India as their thrust. India is the partner country at the Hanover Technology Fair and at the Frankfurt Book Fair India is the guest.
In April 2006 on the occasion of the Hanover Fair the newly elected German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh are expected to attend an economic summit. As per the latest Indo-German trade statistics, bilateral trade volume indicates continuous growth though Indian exports to Germany show a fluctuating trend. Apart from trade and other issues, in the coming months the EU and specifically Germany would take concrete measures to fulfil its larger strategic goals in the partnership with India. As Christian Wagner has pointed out, while at first sight close cooperation between India and the US may contradict German and European interests, India forging closer ties with the US could in fact open up new possibilities for German and European partnership with India including in multilateral conflict resolution strategies.
Consequently, diplomatic measures and attractive investment offers from Germany to India, in competition with US, may be expected in the coming months. But it would be misleading to interpret increased German foreign policy initiatives towards India as anti-American, because rapprochement in transatlantic relations, i.e., US-German, is the first and foremost task of the new German government. Competitive diplomatic steps from the EU, an aspiring international actor and also a strategic partner of India, are anticipated in the coming months to make their presence more distinct in India.
US President George Bush's 26-hour visit to Pakistan was foredoomed to failure as the two leaders had two different sets of issues on their agenda for talks, which shows their divergent perceptions of mutual roles and concerns in the region. While terrorism, nuclear non-proliferation and democracy held salience for George Bush, General Musharraf seemed inclined to forging strategic cooperation and securing civil nuclear technology and US mediation in Kashmir. On the one hand, George Bush managed to put across his concerns on the issues he thought were vital to the US' security interests, and on the other, in an articulated and nuanced manner, he refused to oblige General Musharraf on the civil nuclear cooperation and Kashmir issues.
Take the issue of democracy. George Bush said "In the long run he (General Musharraf) understands that extremism can be defeated by freedom and democracy and prosperity and better education…I believe democracy is Pakistan's future…President Musharraf has made clear that he intends to hold elections." He also stressed on holding 'free and fair' elections in 2007. In response, General Musharraf strongly defended his system by mentioning his contribution to democracy in Pakistan, namely, empowerment of people, minorities, women and free press, which sounded rather unconvincing in the light of the ground realities in Pakistan. Interestingly, George Bush's remarks established that the rise of extremism in Pakistan was related to Musharraf's policy of appeasement of the mullahs at the expense of mainstream parties in the present political dispensation and now he must prepare to relinquish power to democratic parties by holding free and fair elections in 2007. This was a rather distressing note for General Musharraf.
On the non-proliferation issue, all that Pakistan could get was passing praise for agreeing to join the Container Security Initiative (CSI). "Pakistan is an important partner in fighting proliferation…we'll continue to work together to ensure that the world's most dangerous weapons do not end up in the hands of the terrorists," is how George Bush described the US' concerns, and attaching caution as a caveat. The remarks pointed towards the A Q Khan episode in which the role of the Pakistani establishment, particularly the military and ISI had come under the scanner raising questions about the safety of WMDs in Pakistan. Plus, hand in glove relations between the military and Islamists have bred more apprehensions in American minds in the wake of rising anti-US sentiments in Pakistan in the post-9/11 period.
Pakistan's fragile democracy, which has been tampered with by different military regimes and misused by the civilian regimes, has failed to evolve effective constitutional provisions to curtail and control the military's powers and adventurism. The A Q Khan episode is a testimony to this. Though both civilian and military regimes supported the nuclear programme, it was the military that controlled it without allowing any outside interference. On account of Pakistan's dismal non-proliferation record, George Bush declined to commit on civil nuclear supplies to Pakistan. He said, "We discussed a civilian nuclear programme, and I explained that Pakistan and India are different countries with different needs and different histories. So as we proceed forward, our strategies will take in effect those well-known differences."
This statement could be considered the cornerstone of Bush's visit to Pakistan, which to a large extent de-hyphenated the 'India-Pakistan' nuclear relationship. Pakistan had always sought parity with India by linking its nuclear programme and the larger debate on non-proliferation to it. Bush's statement, in a single stroke, acknowledged India's impeccable non-proliferation record and elevated India into the league of responsible nuclear powers.
On the energy issue, George Bush clarified that the US beef with the Iranian regime was its nuclear weapons programme and not the gas pipeline. Though he assured General Musharraf that the US would address Pakistan's energy deficiency, this failed to evoke much enthusiasm for it was limited to the gas pipeline. The US ignored Pakistan's cry for parity with India, implying that Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme in the light of the A Q Khan affair could not be equated with India's responsible and clean nuclear record.
On the terrorism front, in the wake of September 11 attacks, General Musharraf had no option but to join the global war on terrorism (GWOT). It brought rich dividends for Pakistan - the subsequent $3 billion in US aid and waiving of several loans resurrected its tottering economy. It was also granted the status of Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA). But now, Pakistan's role in GWOT, supposedly the lone bargaining chip in General Musharraf's hands, has come to be seen as insufficient by the US. Bush's statement, "Part of my mission today was to determine whether or not the president is as committed as he has been in the past (emphasis added) to bring these terrorists to justice, and he is," emanated out of this scepticism towards Pakistan's commitment to the cause. There have been lapses and gaps in intelligence-sharing on the whereabouts of Osama bin Laden, his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri and other key leaders which were also possibly interpreted by the US as deliberate on Pakistan's part. Hence, General Musharraf was asked to do more in defeating the Al Qaeda.
It is also very frustrating for Pakistan to find the US pointing out shortcomings and inadequacies in its role in Afghanistan, while simultaneously praising India's efforts in providing training to the Afghan assembly staff, elected leaders and security forces, as well as its provision of aid to Kabul for reconstruction. In the same vein, George Bush's description of India as 'global power' and 'natural partner of US' at Purana Qila (old fort) in New Delhi on March 3, 2006 was seen as incongruent to Pakistan's role and ground realities in the region. President Bush's comments that 'India helped the Afghan people to get back on their feet who will always remember that in their hours of need India stood by them' was rejected in Pakistan, considering that the new US-India partnership for the cause of 'democracy and liberty' accorded a dominant role to India in regional affairs. Analysts believe that Pakistan as a US frontline ally in the region, in spite of losing hundreds of soldiers in the fight against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, finds its strategic depth in Afghanistan eroded significantly due to the Indian role.
On the Kashmir issue too, the story was no different as George Bush ruled out any mediation and called for bilateral effort to settle the differences. Unlike Pakistan, he also shared the need for confidence building measures for changing the atmospherics and enhancing trade as a solution to India-Pakistan conflict. This negated General Musharraf's assertion that the CBMs have facilitated only the atmospherics and trust aspect but not the resolution portion per se. The US response on Kashmir perhaps dampened the spirits not only in Pakistan but also among the separatists in Jammu & Kashmir and the All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC). Possibly, the resulting despair may heighten terrorist activities in J&K and elsewhere in India, inspired by Pakistan purely for domestic consumption. The bomb blasts in the Sankatmochan temple and railway station in Varanasi on March 7, 2006, which killed 20 people and injured over 50 others, could just be the beginning of another round of killings and bloodshed to be undertaken at Pakistan's behest.
George Bush's visit to Pakistan, considered by many as a 'balancing act' and 'dull affair', provided a trigger for the mullahs, mainstream parties and the media to step up pressure on General Musharraf. More and more have now begun to join the debate arguing that Pakistan should accept that the US is not a trusted ally given that Washington had abandoned it on previous occasions as well. Many also contend that Pakistan must understand that the US has no role whatsoever to play in the Kashmir issue. The US nuclear deal with India and moves to establish a long-term strategic partnership with Pakistan's bloody rival has come to re-emphasize the fact that Pakistan at the most can only be a tactical and not strategic ally. After years of support to the US in Afghanistan and doing this at peril to his own life and political standing in Pakistan, General Musharraf has only got a sermon on the need to strengthen democracy by holding free and fair elections in 2007, to do more on the counter-terrorism front, and settle the Kashmir issue bilaterally. It is heartbreaking and demoralizing indeed! The opposition in Pakistan has stepped up pressure on General Musharraf asking for his resignation because of the failure of his foreign and defence policies, signified by the US presidential visit and the sermons pronounced by George Bush. General Musharraf himself off late has tried to soothe tempers saying that Pakistan does not want to indulge in an arms race with India and seek parity with it and that, therefore, Pakistan's relations with the US should be seen in isolation from US-India relations. But his domestic critics are likely to trash this argument by contending that even in the US-Pakistan context alone the Bush visit has put both General Musharraf and Pakistan out in the cold on all vital matters.
In the aftermath of the Bush visit, two trends can be expected. First, one may witness a spurt in terrorist activities in J&K and elsewhere in India, not only to convince domestic constituencies that the Kashmir issue is very much the priority but also to keep the 'K' factor alive for political purposes. In 2007, supposedly the election year in Pakistan, General Musharraf may resort to old tactics of diverting attention to external threats and challenges and hence justify his indispensability for Pakistan. Second, it would lead to more robust Sino-Pakistan ties in the coming years. Just before George Bush's visit, General Musharraf had visited China and signed several deals pertaining to defence and energy cooperation including nuclear, and secured Chinese investments to the tune of $21 billion. Both have enjoyed strong relations historically and have reasons to feel concerned with the rise of India and its growing proximity to the US. But for now, General Musharraf has not only to figure out how to make Pakistan recover from the current debacle but also craft a policy that balances its relationship with both the US and China.
President APJ Abdul Kalam began his three day (March 8-10, 2006) state visit to Myanmar on March 8 at the invitation of Sr General Than Shwe who himself had visited India in October 2004. The visit began on International Women's Day: whether this was a mere coincidence or carried any hidden symbolism (to draw attention to the continued house arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi) is open to interpretation. However, one thing is certain. The first visit by an Indian head of state to this Southeast Asian nation shows that New Delhi attaches great importance to this geopolitically crucial country irrespective of the kind of political system it currently has.
During his visit President Kalam is expected to visit Yangon University, Shwe Dagon Pagoda, and the memorial (mazaar) to the last Mughal emperor Bahadur Shah Zafar, besides seeing Bagan and Mandalay. Myanmar has had a steady stream of high level visits from India. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi paid a visit in 1987. India's three service chiefs who have held office at different times have deemed it important to visit Myanmar. The Indian Vice President Bhairon Singh Shekhawat's visit to Myanmar in November 2003 was an important landmark. There were equally significant visits by the Indian External Affairs Minister at different times (Jaswant Singh in April 2002, and Natwar Singh in March 2005). Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran, who had served as India's Ambassador to Myanmar, paid a visit in October 2004. He has described the current visit of the President as a very important visit to a very important neighbour. The then Home Secretary NN Vohra had visited Myanmar in 1994 and the process was continued by his successors right upto VK Duggal in October 2005.
Viewed from Myanmar's perspective, its objective is clearly to attain greater integration with the international community and greater manoeuvrability in its foreign relation (which would in a sense be an extension of its earlier emphasis on nonalignment).This explains its urge to have a vibrant relationship with China, which country Myanmar Prime Minister Soe Win visited between February 14 and 18, 2006). Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono paid a visit to Myanmar on March 1-2, 2006. During this visit, Indonesia's foreign minister, Hassan Wirajuda who accompanied the President, offered to share his country's expereince in transition to democracy. The Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar is waiting in the wings to visit Myanmar.
When US President Bush came to India recently, he did criticise Myanmar's human rights record in his speech but what is significant is that Myanmar did not find a mention in India's joint declaration with the United States. From India's standpoint, the objectives it views as signifcant are: energy requirements, infrastructure projects, counter-insurgency, counter-narcotics policy, development of the northeast, and promotion of the Look East policy.
There seems to be an urgency to India's need to import natural gas from an offshore block close to the Arakan coast of Myanmar in which the Gas Autority of India Limited (GAIL) and ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL) have stakes. India and Myanamar are expected to sign an agreement on gas supply from Myanmar's Arakan coast. Following Bangladeshi recalcitrance over this issue, India is left with only two options - a (far more expensive) pipeline bypassing Bangladesh through India's northeastern states, or shipping the gas by converting it into LNG. The latter appears to be a viable option and could be finally adopted. Keeping in view India's rapidly growing import dependence for energy (to keep pace with the requirements of GDP growth) it is worth taking Myanmar seriously as a source of energy.
The Kaladan multi-modal transport project is also expected to get a boost with the President's visit. A multi-modal transport from Mizoram to Sitwe could provide "an alternative outlet to the sea for Northeast India in addition to transit through Chittagong" or through the Siliguri neck and Assam.
Following the successful operation in Bhutan against militant outfits in December 2003, similar hopes were expressed for the Indo-Myanmar border. Talks held during General Joginder Jaswant Singh's visit in November 2005 covered security along the Indo-Myanmar border. During his October 2004 visit to India, Sr Gen Than Shwe had assured India that it would not allow insurgents to operate from the territory of Myanmar. Following that visit the armies of the two sides cooperated in counter-insurgency operations along the border in November 2004. India's Home Secretary VK Duggal visited Myanmar for the eleventh round of talks between Home Secretaries of the two countries, during which an agreement was reached on co-operation in tackling insurgents, arms smuggling drugs, etc. on October 14, 2005.
India's trade with Myanmar has steadily increased after border trade was opened at Moreh-Tamu in April 1995 and was targeted at $1 billion this year. India is among Myanmar's top export destinations. But as relations between the two countries deepen, co-operation in other areas like human resource development, education and biotechnology will need to be emphasized.
Military-to-military contacts between India and Myanmar have grown. The Indian Army Chief's visit in November 2005 was followed by the visit of India's Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Arun Prakash in January 2006. In February 2005 the Myanmar Chief of Naval Staff Vice Admiral Soe Thein visited India. Two Indian warships, guided missile destroyer INS Ranjit and the missile corvette INS Kuthar, visited Yangon to participate in some basic exercises with the Myanmar Navy between December 22 and 26, 2005. A corvette of the Myanmar Navy participated in the multi-nation exercise Milan-06 off the Andaman coast (January 9-14, 2006).
A strong and stable Myanmar is in India's interest and it is equally in India's interest to promote agriculture on which Myanmar deeply depends. During his visit President Kalam is expected to discuss the setting up of a ground station in Myanmar which would receive relevant data for better crop management from Indian satellites.
From the Indian point of view, a stable Myanmar is a good in itself and must not be construed as illustrative of Indian rivalry with China. If economics is the prime mover behind India's Look East policy, the economic transformation of India's eastern neighbour could play a very powerful role in its political transformation to a more democratic regime. The process may be gradual but if Myanmar is helped along in this process by neighbouring ASEAN States (including Indonesia which has an experience in this regard) and India, the results may be more enduring and least disruptive.
With President Bush having concluded, in the eyes of both governments, a highly successful visit to India, the time has come to take stock of developments and to assess whether, as has been asserted over and over again, the outcome has been a win-win for both countries.
In the course of his visit to the United States last July, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Bush signed a landmark agreement whose intent was to "transform" the relationship between the two countries.
Was the relationship in such dire need of transformation? The "Next Steps in Strategic Partnership" or NSSP, initiated in 2004, seemed to be doing an adequate job of removing many of the irritants coming in the way of improved relations, many of them legacies from the Cold War era. But the NSSP, despite its nomenclature, was, at best, a mechanism for normalizing relations between the two countries. The leadership in both countries felt the need to accelerate the process of improving ties through an approach other than the slow step-by-step glide path envisaged by the NSSP.
Thus, the impetus to ratchet up ties and to address outstanding issues such as the nuclear technology denial regime was predicated on political, economic and strategic imperatives on both sides. Again, once the agreement had been signed, the momentum for following up on the Agreement was also provided by the very same imperatives. As a result, much has happened in the short span of seven months between the Prime Minister's visit to the United States and the President's reciprocal visit to India.
The main driver for improved relations on the Indian side was provided by economic compulsions. The Prime Minister, who was responsible for initiating India's economic reforms in 1992, has been clear in his mind that India's growth has reached an inflection point, and that further growth can be sustained only with an infusion of foreign investment to overhaul our decaying infrastructure and to increase competitiveness and productivity. India also needed access to the latest cutting edge technologies, largely available with the United States, to power its economic growth. Such access was largely limited by the US export licensing regimes, which barred the export of high technology with the potential for dual use, both in the civilian and military spheres. These restrictions also cast a further shadow over investment by American companies in India, already constrained by fears of bureaucratic hurdles and infrastructural shortcomings. Though the Indian economy has been racing along on the back of pent-up demand, speed bumps were already looming ahead because of the lack of adequate infrastructure. In the energy sector alone, as reported by Andy Mukherjee in the Wall Street Journal, the recent economic survey released by the Finance Ministry had computed that in the current fiscal year, goods and services worth $68 billion hadn't been produced because of power shortages. According to the Prime Minister, India needed a yearly investment of $150 billion to shore up its infrastructure.
The economic logic for closer relations with the United States was amply supported by the changing geo-political situation. Though India was being courted by all the major powers and being offered a seat at various high tables, only the United States could offer an optimum combination of economic and strategic benefits. But relations could only take off if there was a revaluation of strategic equations on the American side, one that factored in India's security challenges and foreign policy goals and aspirations. Hitherto, India had been on the margins of American political and strategic thinking, as a result of which much of the policy towards India was dictated by the predilections of the non-proliferation and pro-Pakistan lobbies within and outside the bureaucracy. Despite recognition at the political level for the need to reassess equations with India, the inertia of the pre-existing relationship came in the way of any meaningful movement forward. Only the political leadership in the two countries could work up the necessary momentum required to "transform" the relationship.
The considerations that played a part in convincing President Bush of the advantages in advancing US-India relations are only too well known but bear retelling. Economic considerations such as the huge Indian market that was 300 million strong and reducing global dependence on fossil fuels dovetailed with strategic goals such as that of propping up India as a foil against the increasing weight that China carried by virtue of its size and gargantuan economy.
India was also a shining example of the ability of democracy to scale up to provide representative government to a billion-plus people, nearly one-fifth of humanity. The cause of democracy promotion so ardently advocated by the President has undoubtedly got a shot in the arm with India's participation.
There was also the bonus of drawing in the monetarily well endowed but politically unattached Indian American community into the folds of the Republican Party, a small but potentially significant step in Karl Rove's goal of creating a permanent majority for the GOP.
This is the backdrop against which the strategic partnership was conceived and carried through. Beginning with the signing of the joint agreement on July 18, 2005, and notwithstanding the tortuous parleys that went into fashioning a break-through agreement that untangled the nuclear knot, the two sides have institutionalized the mechanisms for closer co-operation and signed a slew of other agreements. A back of the envelope count shows that no less than seventeen agreements have been signed and initiatives launched over the past twelve months in a wide spectrum of areas ranging from trade promotion, to agriculture, to space co-operation to defence co-production to AIDS prevention. During the current visit, one of the major criticisms of industry, that the two governments have to lead the way and focus on particular areas, has been addressed with the establishment of a $100 million project for agricultural co-operation and a $30 million project for co-operation in science and technology. In addition, 18 joint ventures were also agreed upon between the two governments. Many other projects are in the works, including a $500 million project to set up development laboratories where the latest cutting edge technologies will be used to develop products such as life-saving drugs. All these seek to replicate the US model of R&D where strong linkages are established between government, universities and the private sector, thus providing each with a stake in ensuring the success of the venture as well as a laid out path from the laboratory to the marketplace.
The major coup for the Indian government has been the signing of a civilian nuclear deal on terms largely favourable to it and addressing the concerns of the scientific community and others that it would affect India's strategic nuclear programme. As Dr. M.R. Srinivasan, former head of the Atomic Energy Commission and a critic of the initial deal, put it: "From the Indian point of view it is a good agreement. The last minute hurdle was over acceptance of a clause regarding safeguards in perpetuity. But the compromise was reached with India getting a guarantee of uninterrupted power supply."
In a sense, the Indo-US Strategic partnership is all about power supply, not just electricity to light up the villages or guaranteed uranium supply to feed the nuclear reactors, but also co-operation on the economic front that will ultimately feed all the other tangibles and intangibles that go into the making of a great power.